Manuel Guevara v. Morris Air, Inc., Tur Mexico, Does 1-10 : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1996
Manuel Guevara v. Morris Air, Inc., Tur Mexico,
Does 1-10 : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Roger H. Bullock; Strong & Hanni.
Alber W. Gray; Robert J. Debry & Associates; Attorneys for Appellant.
ROGER H. BULLOCK (Bar No. 485) STRONG & HANNI 600 Boston Building #9 Exchange
Place Salt Lake City, UT 84111 Telephone: (801) 532-7080 Attorneys for Appellee
ROBERT J. DeBRY (Bar No. A0849) ROBERT J. DeBRY & ASSOCIATES 4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 Telephone: (801) 262-8915 Attorneys for Appellant
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Guevara v. Morris Air, No. 960832 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/582

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MANUEL GUEVARA, ; 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ] 
v. ] 
MORRIS AIR, INC., TUR MEXICO, ; 
and DOES 1-10, inclusive, ] 
Defendants/Appellees ] 
) Case No. 960832CA 
) Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE MORRIS AIR, INC. 
APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE SANDRA PEULER, PRESIDING 
ROGER H. BULLOCK (Bar No. 485) 
STRONG & HANNI 
600 Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
Attorneys for Appellee 
ROBERT J. DeBRY (Bar No. A0849) 
ROBERT J. DeBRY & ASSOCIATES 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
Attorneys for Appellant 
PARTIES 
The caption of this case in the Utah Court of Appeals 
shows the names of all parties to the proceeding in the 
court below. Tur Mexico was named as a defendant, but has 
not been served and is not a party to this appeal. 
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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§78-2-2(3)(k), 78-2a-3(2)(j ) . The 
Order granting summary judgment was entered on July 10, 199 6 
(R.123-24). Appellant's notice of appeal was filed on August 
9, 1996 (R.125-27). The Utah Supreme Court transferred this 
case to the Utah Court of Appeals on or about December 27, 
1996. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Summary judgment is proper only when there are no 
genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c). Because the court only resolves legal issues on 
appeal from a summary judgment, the court does not defer to 
the trial court's conclusions of law, but it reviews them 
for correctness. Averett v. Grange, 909 P.2d 246 (Utah 
1995). The following issues are presented for review: 
ISSUE I. Whether the trial court was correct in 
finding that the undisputed facts showed no agency 
relationship existed between Morris Air and Tur Mexico; 
therefore Morris Air cannot be held liable for any 
negligence of Tur Mexico or its bus driver. 
ISSUF . Whether the trial court was correct in 
1 
finding the contract between Morris Air and Manuel Guevara 
clearly and unambiguously states that Morris Air is not 
liable for any negligence of ground transportation companies 
and others. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
This appeal concerns no determinative constitutional 
provision, statute, rule or regulation. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
Plaintiff and appellant Manuel Guevara purchased a Tur 
Mexico excursion bus tour of Puerto Vallarta, as well as 
charter transport and hotel lodging through Morris Air 
Corporation (R.66-68). While on the bus tour, Mr. Guevara 
was injured while walking in front of the bus (R.71-76). 
The operator of the bus was Tur Mexico (R.48). 
Mr. Guevara filed this action against Morris Air, Inc. 
and Tur Mexico, alleging that Tur Mexico was the agent of 
Morris Air, and that Morris Air is liable for Tur Mexico's 
negligence (R.l-6). Although Tur Mexico was a named 
defendant in this suit, no steps whatsoever have been taken 
to prosecute the action against it. 
Disposition in Court Below 
After both sides conducted discovery over a period of 
one year and four months, Morris Air moved for summary 
2 
judgment on the ground that it could not be held liable for 
the negligence of Tur Mexico (R.45-54). The motion was 
briefed by the parties, and oral arguments were heard by 
Hon. Sandra Peuler on July 1, 1996. On that date the judge 
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The 
Court explicitly stated the reasons for its decision as 
follows: 
First of all, with regard to the contract itself, 
that was the ticket, and I think that the terms of 
that are very clear. And that ticket, that 
contract, contains an express disclaimer by Morris 
as to the negligence of ground transportation 
companies and others. So I think the contract 
terms, first of all, negate any actual or express 
authority. . . . And in terms of the brochures, I 
believe that the brochures, the language in the 
brochures simply does not raise any indication of a 
principal/agent relationship in the terms that 
plaintiff seeks to have the Court find. I think 
the contract, going back to that, clearly says what 
the relationship is and the brochures do not raise 
any inference that are contrary to that. 
(R.141-42). A full copy of Judge Peuler's ruling is 
attached as "Addendum A." Judge Peuler's Order granting 
summary judgment was entered on July 10, 1996. Plaintiff 
appeals from this judgment. 
Relief Sought on Appeal 
Morris Air, Inc. respectfully requests this Court to 
affirm summary judgment in its favor. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff-Appellant Manuel Guevara purchased a Tur 
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Mexico excursion bus tour of Puerto Vallarta, as well as 
charter air transport and lodging through Morris Air 
Corporation (R.66-68). 
2. Morris Air acted as a travel agent in selling the 
optional Tur Mexico bus tour to Mr. Guevara (R.49-52)• 
3. Morris Air instructed Mr. Guevara that he did not 
have to purchase the excursion bus tour from Morris Air, 
that he could, in fact, purchase it in Mexico, but that 
Morris Air could offer him a discount on the ticket price he 
paid for the tour (R.68). 
4. Mr. Guevara chose to purchase the ticket through 
Morris Air (R.67). 
5. Before Mr. Guevara left Salt Lake City, Morris Air 
sent him a "prepaid travel voucher" evidencing his purchase 
of the Tur Mexico bus tour. The voucher states that the 
name of the supplier of this "added attraction" is Tur 
Mexico (R.99). 
6. Morris Air also sent Mr. Guevara a written itinerary 
which noted the name of the hotel and also listed the name 
and address of Tur Mexico as a provider of "other services" 
(R. 81-82). 
7. Before Mr. Guevara left Salt Lake City, Morris Air 
delivered to him his charter ticket for air travel. The 
ticket provides at paragraph 13: 
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RESPONSIBILITY: FOR PUBLIC CHARTER TRIPS ONLY, 
MORRIS AIR SERVICE, INC., acts as principal and 
is responsible for making arrangements with 
airlines, hotels, ground transportation 
companies, and other travel suppliers to provide 
the services and accommodations included in the 
trip; provided that where MORRIS AIR SERVICE is 
the airline, it is responsible for providing 
directly to passengers the subject air 
transportation. In all other cases, MORRIS AIR 
SERVICE acts only as agent of the respective 
airliners) and other suppliers, and, as such, 
shall not be responsible for the provision or 
operation of such flights or other services and 
accommodations. In each case, transportation 
provided by the airline is subject to all of the 
terms and conditions of the respective carrier's 
applicable tariff and/or contract of carriage; 
refer to the air transportation ticket for 
conditions of contract and notice of 
incorporated terms, and inguire of the airline 
for additional details. Also, other airlines, 
hotelsf ground transportation companies, and 
other travel suppliers are not agents or 
employees of MORRIS AIR SERVICE, but are 
independent contractors over whom MORRIS AIR 
SERVICE has no control. Accordingly, you hereby 
agree that, except as otherwise provided herein, 
MORRIS AIR SERVICE is not responsible or liable 
for any loss, injury, expensef damage to 
property, or personal sickness, injury or death 
which results directly or indirectly from (a) 
any act or failure to act (including, but not 
limited to, delays), whether negligent or 
otherwise, of any other airline, hotel, ground 
transportation company, or other travel 
supplier, or (b) any other cause or act of 
whatsoever nature, beyond MORRIS AIR'S direct 
and immediate control. Except as otherwise 
specified herein, in the event of non-operation 
of any Public Charter flight due to reasons 
beyond our control, our sole liability shall be 
to refund to you that portion of the price 
allocable to the services not provided. Any 
deviation from the advertised trip which you 
initiate is solely your responsibility. Other 
matters concerning your responsibilities and 
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ours are as follows: 
(R.119)(emphasis added). 
8. Mr. Guevara was injured on the Tur Mexico excursion 
bus tour, while walking in front of the bus (R.71-76). 
Fortunately, he has made a good recovery. 
9. Mr. Guevara filed this action against Morris Air, 
Inc. and Tur Mexico. However no steps have been taken to 
further prosecute the action against Tur Mexico. 
10. Morris Air moved for summary judgment on the 
ground that it could not be held liable for the negligence 
of Tur Mexico's bus driver (R.45-54). 
11. There is no known written contract between Morris 
Air and Tur Mexico (R.49).1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. Summary judgment was correctly granted to 
Morris Air on the issue of Morris Air's liability for Tur 
Mexico's possible negligence. Morris Air merely acted as 
the travel agent with respect to the Tur Mexico bus 
1
 Mr. Guevara claims in his brief that the fact that Morris 
Air failed to produce in discovery, or even locate, any written 
contract between Morris Air and Tur Mexico is not sufficient to 
show that Morris Air was only a travel agent in this situation. 
However, Morris Air faithfully conducted discovery on this 
issue, and if Mr. Guevara was not satisfied with the results of 
this discovery, he could have opposed Morris Air's motion for 
summary judgment on these grounds, pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Brief of Appellant, pp. 4,14). 
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excursion. There is no evidence in the record which 
contradicts this assertion. Morris Air did not represent 
that it was a principal and that Tur Mexico was its agent. 
Further, there is no evidence that Morris Air had a "right 
to control" Tur Mexico, an important element in principal-
agent relationships. The trial court found that none of the 
evidence raised by plaintiff gave "any indication of a 
principal/agent relationship in the terms the plaintiff 
seeks to have the Court find" (R.142). As the travel agent, 
Morris Air is not liable for any negligence of the Tur 
Mexico bus operation. 
POINT II. Summary judgment was correctly granted to 
Morris Air because the contract between Morris Air and 
Manuel Guevara clearly and expressly disclaimed Morris Air's 
liability for any injuries caused by ground transportation 
companies. When taken as a whole, paragraph 13 of the 
contract is unambiguous on this issue. Further, this 
provision unambiguously shows that Tur Mexico was an 
independent contractor of Morris Air, not an agent for 
Morris Air. The trial court correctly concluded in its 
ruling that no evidence in the record contradicts paragraph 
13 of the contract and the record does not raise a material 




THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
TO THE DEFENDANT BECAUSE THE UNDISPUTED FACTS SHOW 
THAT MORRIS AIR AND TUR MEXICO DID NOT HAVE A 
PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP. 
There is no claim that the driver of the bus was 
employed by Morris Air, or by any entity other than Tur 
Mexico. Mr. Guevara does not attempt to argue that the 
driver was a servant of Morris Air, and there are no facts 
which would support such a claim. Rather, Mr. Guevara 
argues that the driver's possible negligence should be 
attributed not only to his employer Tur Mexico, but to 
Morris Air, an entirely different business. Mr. Guevara 
makes this leap of logic based solely on the fact that 
Morris Air and Tur Mexico did business with each other as 
travel agent and supplier of a bus tour, respectively. The 
trial court correctly found that there was no ground for 
vicarious liability against Morris Air and dismissed it on 
summary judgment. 
In a principal-agent relationship, "an agent is a 
person authorized by another to act on his behalf and under 
his control." Vina v. Jefferson Insurance Co. of N.Y., 761 
P.2d 581, 585 (Utah App. 1988). Such a relationship is 
generally created contractually, where one of the parties 
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confides the management of some business to be conducted in 
his name and by which the other assumes to do the business 
and to render an account of it. The right of the principal 
to control the conduct of the agent with respect to matters 
entrusted to him is the test of agency, and constitutes an 
essential element of the agency relation. Restatement 
(Second) of Agency § 14 (1958). 
In determining the status of a principal-agent 
relationship, the Utah court has applied a "right to 
control" test, similar to the one used to determine the 
existence of an employer-employee relationship. The court 
outlined and applied this test in Foster v. Steed, 432 P.2d 
60, 62 (Utah 1967) as follows: 
In general, the determinative guestion has been 
posed as one of "control", the view being that if 
the defendant controls, or has the right of 
control, the manner in which the operations are to 
be carried out, the defendant is liable as a 
master, while, if the control extends only to the 
result to be achieved, the actor is regarded as an 
independent contractor, and the defendant is liable 
under neither respondeat superior nor the workmen's 
compensation statutes. 
In Foster, the court grappled with the guestion of 
whether a principal-agent relationship existed between 
Texaco Oil Company and service station operators in 
determining whether Texaco could be liable for injuries to a 
third person arising out of the tortious conduct of the 
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service station operators. The trial court denied Texaco's 
motion for summary judgment "on the grounds that it cannot 
be said that there was no genuine issue as to any material 
fact or facts concerning the relationship between Texaco and 
the other defendants in the operation of the service 
station. . ." Id. at 61. Texaco appealed and argued it was 
not liable because the service station operators were 
independent contractors, not agents of Texaco. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded for entry 
of summary judgment in favor of Texaco. The court applied 
the "right to control" test and asked "whether the oil 
company has retained the right to control the details of the 
day-to-day operation of the service station; control or 
influence over results alone being insufficient." In 
Foster the relationship between Texaco and the station 
operators was controlled by a lease and an agreement of 
sale. Under these documents both parties had mutual 
obligations regarding the station, but were separate legal 
entities, even though the station operated under the Texaco 
name. Plaintiff offered the following evidence to contradict 
Texaco's claim that the station operators were not agents 
and to show that Texaco "controlled" the service station: 
Texaco had responsibility for making certain the 
building was properly maintained, and its 
representatives conducted inspections of the 
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premises. It further effected the needed repairs 
after the fire. Wheeler and others were encouraged 
to wear the Texaco uniform and to identify with its 
products. The only pumps in the station bore the 
Texaco trademark, and the sale of any other 
products under the Texaco trademark was forbidden. 
The manner and nature of delivery of products was 
under the control of Texaco, and it was customary 
for the operators to buy all items for sale from 
Texaco. The company had established criteria for 
obtaining operators for their stations, and the 
operators attended a school where they received 
instructions on marketing, operations, and safety. 
All documents evidencing the relationship of the 
parties were prepared by Texaco on standard Texaco 
letterhead. 
Id. at 61. Plaintiff argued that this evidence should 
"create a jury guestion, and that a jury would be acting 
reasonably in finding Texaco liable based upon the full 
extent of the relationship and involvement of the company." 
IdL at 61. In granting summary judgment for Texaco, the 
court focused on the fact that Texaco's witnesses testified 
that it "did not set the hours of operation, or control the 
hiring or firing of personnel, reguire reports, or prevent 
purchasing products from other sources." Ld. at 61, 63. 
The court reasoned that "[t]he areas of mutual contact 
demonstrate a mutual interest in the sale of Texaco products 
and the success of the business. None of the evidence cited 
by plaintiff indicates that Texaco retained control of the 
day-to-day operation but, rather, merely influenced the 
result to be achieved, revealing an independent contractor 
11 
status." Ld. at 63 . 
The Foster decision was approved and followed recently 
by the Utah Supreme Court in Glover v. Boy Scouts of 
America, 923 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1996), affirming summary 
judgment in favor of Boy Scouts of America on the ground 
that it did not have the right to control a local 
Scoutmaster and therefore could not be found vicariously 
liable for his tortious conduct. 
A. Morris Air has never represented that 
Tur Mexico was its agent. 
In the case at issue, plaintiff argues that Morris Air 
is the principal of its agent, Tur Mexico, and therefore is 
liable for Tur Mexico's possible negligence. But Morris Air 
was merely a travel agent which sold the ticket for the 
excursion bus tour to Mr. Guevara. Morris Air informed Mr. 
Guevara when he called that he did not have to purchase the 
excursion bus tour from Morris Air, that he could wait and 
purchase such a tour in Mexico, but that Morris Air offered 
a discount ticket price on the tour (R.68). Mr. Guevara 
chose to purchase his ticket through Morris Air, rather than 
make other arrangements on his own in Mexico. Tur Mexico 
operates its own business running excursion bus tours in 
Mexico; Morris Air operates its own business as a charter 
air service and as a travel agent for other services in Salt 
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Lake City. Tur Mexico never referred to itself as a part of 
Morris Air. When Tur Mexico communicated to its customers 
in Mexico, it did so on Tur Mexico letterhead. And Mr. 
Guevara received his "prepaid travel voucher" from Morris 
Air, the excursion bus tour was listed as being conducted by 
Tur Mexico, not Morris Air. These facts do not support Mr. 
Guevara's assertion that Morris Air acted as the principal 
and that Tur Mexico was its agent in this situation. 
Written materials state that the Morris Air Service 
representative in Puerto Vallarta was Tur Mexico (R.79). 
This does show a close association between the two, as Mr. 
Guevara asserts in his brief. However, this does not show 
that Morris Air had the right or power to control, which is 
the requirement for agency. 
There is no showing on the record that Tur Mexico's 
position as a representative of Morris Air had any 
connection with Tur Mexico's operation of the bus tour on 
which Mr. Guevara was injured. Stated differently, there is 
no evidence that the operation of the bus tour arose out of 
Tur Mexico's role as a representative of Morris Air in 
Puerto Vallarta. On the contrary, since there is no 
evidence that Morris Air itself had any role in the bus tour 
operation, the only reasonable inference is that Tur 
Mexico's bus tour operation was separate and independent 
13 
from its activity as a local representative for a foreign 
travel agent, Morris Air. 
B. Morris Air had no "right to control" Tur Mexico's 
operations or activities, including Tur Mexico's 
choice of employees and/or the maintenance of Tur 
Mexico's vehicles. 
The right of the principal to control the conduct of 
the agent with respect to matters entrusted to him is the 
test of agency, and constitutes an essential element of the 
agency relation. The Foster court relied on whether Texaco 
had the right to control the day-to-day operations of the 
service station to determine the status of the relationship 
between the two. In this case, any factual "connection" 
between Morris Air and Tur Mexico is more tenuous than the 
relationship in the Foster case. The two are completely 
separate companies; there is no known written contract 
between them; and Morris Air merely sold a Tur Mexico 
excursion bus ticket at a discount price to Mr. Guevara. In 
light of the fact that Morris Air had no ability to control 
the day-to-day operations of Tur Mexico, let alone the 
hiring and firing of its employees and the maintenance of 
its vehicles, it would be unjust to hold Morris Air liable 
for the negligence of Tur Mexico in this situation, just as 
it would be unjust to hold Morris Air liable if a waiter in 
the hotel where Mr. Guevara stayed had spilt coffee on and 
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burned him. Without a right of control, it is not sound 
policy to hold Morris Air liable as a principal for another 
travel supplier's wrongs. 
C. Mr. Guevara has not offered any evidence to 
contradict the fact that Morris acted as a 
travel agent in this situation or to raise 
an issue of factual dispute. 
Mr. Guevara argues that he offered documentary and 
testimonial evidence showing Morris Air held Tur Mexico out 
as its agent (Appellant's Brief, p. 13). Mr. Guevara 
misunderstands the requirement for a fact issue on the 
question of agency. In its ruling, the trial court stated 
that it considered Mr. Guevara's evidence, his affidavit and 
the documents, but that it "does not raise issues of 
material fact as to that contract" and "does not raise any 
indication of a principal/agent relationship in the terms 
that plaintiff seeks to have the Court find" (R.142). The 
trial court properly disregarded Mr. Guevara's conclusory 
opinions in his affidavit about what "one party thought" 
about the relationship between Morris Air and Tur Mexico. 
"[0]nce a movant sets forth a factual basis for summary 
judgment, the opponent must respond with specific facts to 
show that there is a genuine issue for trial, and mere 
allegations or denials of a pleading or conclusions in an 
affidavit are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of 
15 
fact." Guardian State Bank v. Roy W. Humpherys, 762 P.2d 
1084, 1086 (Utah 1988); Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). 
Plaintiff also argues that the "factual issue" of the 
relationship between Morris Air and Tur Mexico could not be 
resolved on summary judgment. But the Foster court, faced 
with a more complicated relationship to determine, had no 
difficulty granting summary judgment to Texaco on that 
issue. The Foster court reasoned as follows: 
Summary judgment is not a substitute for trial but 
is rather a judicial search for determining whether 
genuine issues exist as to material facts. Rule 
56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, dictates the 
granting of summary judgment where there is no 
genuine issue of material fact. The plaintiff in 
the instant case has attempted to create factual 
issues, but the whole purpose of summary judgment 
would be defeated if a case could be forced to 
trial by a mere assertion that an issue exists. 
Foster at 63 (quoting Leininger v. Stearns-Roger 
Manufacturing Co., 404 P.2d 33 (Utah 1965). The mere 
existence of factual issues does not preclude summary 
judgment so long as the material issues are not in dispute. 
Such is the case here. Further, many other cases 
establishing that sellers of travel services are not liable 
for the independent negligence of parties performing travel 
services, have also been decided on summary judgment. 
16 
D. Other courts faced with similar issues have 
found no liability of the travel agent for 
the negligence of independent contractors. 
Cases regarding the liability of travel agents in 
similar situations to this one show that the travel agent is 
not liable for the negligence of other travel suppliers. 
See, Lavine v. General Mills, Inc., 519 Fed. Supp. 332 (N.D. 
Ga. 1981), Connolly v. Samuelson, 671 Fed. Supp. 1312 (D. 
Kan. 1987), Weiner v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 401 
N.Y.S.2d 91 (1978), Dorkin v. American Express Co., 345 
N.Y.S.2d 891, Klinghoffer v. Achille Lauro Lines, 816 Fed. 
Supp. 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), Feig v. American Airlines, Inc., 
167 Fed. Supp. 843 (D.C. 1958), Pena v. Sita World 
Travel,Inc., 88 Cal. App.3d 642, 152 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1978). 
In each of those cases, the court granted summary judgment 
to the defendant travel agent who sold the ticket for the 
travel service to the plaintiff. 
Mr. Guevara cites cases which appear to support his 
assertion that courts do not decide these issues on summary 
judgment. But each of the cases cited by Mr. Guevara deals 
with a completely different factual situation and should be 
distinguished. 
In Casey v. Sanborn, Inc. of Texas, 478 S.W.2d 234 
(Tex. App. 1972), the travel agent in Texas and the travel 
service, Romfel Travel Service, in Mexico had a contractual 
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relationship establishing that Romfel was Sanborn's agent in 
Mexico. The facts are closer to the Foster case in that 
Romfel used Sanborn's name in its business transactions; 
Romfel's address and phone number as Sanborn's "Mexico City 
branch office" were listed on the back of Sanborn's 
itinerary folder; Romfel's drivers told customers they 
worked for Sanborn; and Sanborn picked the tour cars and 
drivers. In short, Sanborn had a right to control several 
aspects of Romfel's business. 
In Jacobsen v. Princess Hotels International, Inc., 475 
N.Y.S.2d 846 (1984), the issue was one of piercing the 
corporate veil to determine if the New York courts had 
personal jurisdiction of the hotel at issue through the 
Princess Hotel's corporate office in New York. The court 
stated, 
"[i]t appears there does exist a Princess corporate 
structure which may have a bearing on the issues. . 
. . Furthermore, there is a distinct possibility of 
interlocking relationships which have not been 
disclosed. At the least there should be an 
opportunity for exploration of the facts in advance 
of summary disposition of the issue." 
Id. at 848. The court added, "[o]rdinarily, an independent 
travel or booking agent cannot be held responsible for the 
negligence of its principal, where the agent simply makes 
the reservation or packages the tour." id. at 848. The 
Jacobsen court actually interpreted the status of the 
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"ordinary" relationship as one where the travel agent is the 
agent of its principal, the travel service provider, for 
whom the agent is selling the ticket. In such a case, it 
would be illogical to impute liability on the agent when the 
principal is negligent and causes injury. 
Lastly, in Rookard v. Mexicoachf 680 F.2d 1257 (9th 
Cir. 1982), the issue not decided on summary judgment was 
whether Mexicoach acted as agent for the customers, and 
whether Mexicoach had a duty to warn them about the dangers 
of Mexican travel. The court stated that if Mexicoach had 
been acting as agent for Del Pacifico, the bus company, then 
it would not be liable. But the question was whether a 
principal-agent relationship existed between the Rookards 
and Mexicoach, not between Mexicoach and Del Pacifico. 
Such distinctions lie in each case cited by Mr. 
Guevara, and none of plaintiff's cases support his assertion 
that summary judgment is not proper in cases dealing with 
travel agent liability. In fact, Mr. Guevara's cases seem 
to support Morris Air's assertion that a travel agent is not 
liable for the tortious conduct of other travel providers by 
merely selling the ticket. 
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POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
BECAUSE THE CONTRACT BETWEEN MORRIS AIR AND MANUEL 
GUEVARA CLEARLY AND EXPRESSLY STATES THAT MORRIS AIR 
IS NOT LIABLE FOR ANY NEGLIGENCE OF GROUND 
TRANSPORTATION COMPANIES. 
The back of Mr. Guevara's airline ticket contained 
certain fine print which he claimed to be material to the 
relationship between Morris Air and Tur Mexico (R. 108). On 
the contrary, the ticket language supports Morris Air's 
position. However, it should be noted that the recital on 
the ticket is of limited importance. The existence of a 
principal-agent relationship depends much more on the acts 
and conduct of the parties, than on the formality of 
agreement, Score v. Wilson, 611 P.2d 367, 369 (Utah 1980) 
(dealing with the existence of a joint venture). 
Nevertheless, the ticket language was part of the record for 
summary judgment, and the trial judge reviewed it for the 
purpose of the summary judgment motion. 
Mr. Guevara argues that the trial court did not specify 
the basis for its decision; however, Judge Peuler's ruling 
is very explicit in its reasons for granting summary 
judgment to Morris Air. The trial court stated: 
First of all, with regard to the contract itself, 
that was the ticket, and I think that the terms of 
that are very clear. And that ticket, that 
contract, contains an express disclaimer by Morris 
as to the negligence of ground transportation 
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companies and others. So I think the contract 
terms, first of all, negate any actual or express 
authority. . . . And in terms of the brochures, I 
believe that the brochures, the language in the 
brochures simply does not raise any indication of a 
principal/agent relationship in the terms that 
plaintiff seeks to have the Court find. I think 
the contract, going back to that, clearly says what 
the relationship is and the brochures do not raise 
any inference that are contrary to that. 
(R.141-42). The contract at issue is Mr. Guevara's airline 
ticket. Mr. Guevara relies on paragraph 13 to assert that 
the contract is ambiguous and that Tur Mexico was the agent 
for its principal, Morris Air. Paragraph 13 provides: 
RESPONSIBILITY: FOR PUBLIC CHARTER TRIPS ONLY, 
MORRIS AIR SERVICE, INC., acts as principal and is 
responsible for making arrangements with airlines, 
hotelsf ground transportation companies, and other 
travel suppliers to provide the services and 
accommodations included in the trip; provided that 
where MORRIS AIR SERVICE is the airline, it is 
responsible for providing directly to passengers 
the subject air transportation. In all other 
cases, MORRIS AIR SERVICE acts only as agent of the 
respective airline(s) and other suppliers, and, as 
such, shall not be responsible for the provision or 
operation of such flights or other services and 
accommodations. In each case, transportation 
provided by the airline is subject to all of the 
terms and conditions of the respective carrier's 
applicable tariff and/or contract of carriage; 
refer to the air transportation ticket for 
conditions of contract and notice of incorporated 
terms, and inquire of the airline for additional 
details. Also, other airlines, hotels, ground 
transportation companies, and other travel 
suppliers are not agents or employees of MORRIS AIR 
SERVICE, but are independent contractors over whom 
MORRIS AIR SERVICE has no control. Accordingly, 
you hereby agree that, except as otherwise provided 
herein, MORRIS AIR SERVICE is not responsible or 
liable for any loss, injury, expense, damage to 
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propertyF or personal sickness, injury or death 
which results directly or indirectly from (a) any 
act or failure to act (including, but not limited 
tof delays), whether negligent or otherwise, of any 
other airline, hotel, ground transportation 
company, or other travel supplier, or (b) any other 
cause or act of whatsoever nature, beyond MORRIS 
AIR'S direct and immediate control. Except as 
otherwise specified herein, in the event of non-
operation of any Public Charter flight due to 
reasons beyond our control, our sole liability 
shall be to refund to you that portion of the price 
allocable to the services not provided. Any 
deviation from the advertised trip which you 
initiate is solely your responsibility. Other 
matters concerning your responsibilities and ours 
are as follows: 
(R.119) (emphasis added). Mr. Guevara argues that this 
paragraph is internally contradictory and ambiguous as a 
matter of law. This is not correct. When read as a whole, 
the paragraph states that Morris Air acts as principal in 
making arrangements with travel suppliers to provide their 
services and accommodations. However, such suppliers are 
independent contractors over whom Morris Air has no control. 
A. The contract between Morris Air and Manuel Guevara 
is not ambiguous as a matter of law. 
"A contract is ambiguous only if the words used to 
express the meaning and intention of the parties are 
insufficient in a sense that the contract may be understood 
to reach two or more possible meanings. . . . [h]owever, a 
parties' assertion of a different meaning does not in itself 
render a contract ambiguous." Sparrow v. Tayco Const. Co., 
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846 P.2d 1323 (Utah App. 1993). Mr. Guevara asserts that 
because paragraph 13 uses the term "principal" in one 
sentence and the term "agent" in another, the contract is 
internally contradictory. To support his proposition, Mr. 
Guevara cites Sparrow, a construction contract case where 
the parties had used two different price figures for the 
same piece of eguipment in two different documents. The 
Sparrow court held this contract ambiguous because it was 
unable to determine which price was correct, and the court 
admitted extrinsic evidence to properly construe the 
contract. The distinction in Sparrow is that the contract 
used two different prices in the sale of the same piece of 
eguipment. In a contract for sale, this is a crucial 
factual issue to be determined, over which a genuine, 
material dispute has occurred. 
Mr. Guevara also relies on Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d 1262 
(Utah App. 1994), as an example of an ambiguous contract. 
Cox is a divorce case, where the parties disputed the value 
of the house. The Cox court was left to determine whether 
the price figure for the value of the husband's premarital 
property in the Agreement could be harmonized with the terms 
of the Warranty Deed. The Agreement failed to state whether 
the figure included the value of the house. Because the 
Agreement omitted this material fact, the Cox court stated 
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that the Agreement was ambiguous and allowed extrinsic 
evidence to harmonize the two documents as a contemporaneous 
whole. 
This case is different. The internal inconsistency 
claimed by Mr. Guevara is simply not present. To understand 
the context and application of the paragraph entitled 
"RESPONSIBILITY:," paragraph 13 must be looked at as a 
whole, not piecemeal. Paragraph 13 states that for public 
charter trips only, Morris acts as principal in its role of 
making arrangements with airlines, hotels and ground 
transportation companies. The same paragraph continues that 
in all other cases, Morris Air acts only as the (travel) 
agent and shall not be responsible for the provision or 
operation of the other services. Such language is not 
contradictory. Paragraph 13 further states that all other 
services, including ground transportation, "are not agents 
or employees of Morris Air, but are independent contractors 
over whom Morris Air has no control." This could not be 
more clear. Accordingly, Morris Air is not liable for 
anything that was "beyond Morris Air's direct and immediate 
control." As the trial court ruled, this contract is "very 
clear." It contains an "express disclaimer" of Morris Air's 
liability for others' negligence. Mr. Guevara's alternative 
interpretation of this language, taken out of context, does 
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not render the contract ambiguous as a matter of law. 
Further, the trial court considered Mr. Guevara's 
affidavit and the brochures he received from both Morris Air 
and Tur Mexico before rendering its opinion. The trial 
court properly concluded that this evidence did not raise a 
material, factual dispute, did not render the clear language 
of the contract ambiguous, and did not contradict that 
Morris Air was the travel agent in this situation. 
CONCLUSION 
There was no principal-agent relationship between 
Morris Air and Tur Mexico, and the contract language clearly 
disclaims Morris Air's liability. 
Morris Air had no right to control the operations of 
Tur Mexico. Tur Mexico was identified clearly to Mr. 
Guevara as the supplier of an added attraction, the bus 
tour, purchased by Mr. Guevara (R. 81, 99). Further, the 
contract clearly disclaimed Morris Air's liability for any 
tortious act that was "beyond Morris Air's direct and 
immediate control." It would be unfair to impute liability 
to the travel agent merely because it sold a ticket for a 
bus tour at a discount price. 
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The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed, 
Dated this ( day of April, 1997. 
STRONG & HANNI 
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2 -oooOooo-
3 [Excerpt of proceedings.] 
4 THE COURT: Let me indicate, counsel, I do 
5 appreciate receiving your memos and thought they were both 
6 very well written, and looked up a couple of cases and 
7 appreciate being able to spend the time doing that. So 
8 thanks for providing them to me ahead of time. 
9 The issue that's been argued in this motion for 
summary judgment is whether Morris Air, Incorporated is a 
principal and can be held liable for the negligence of the 
Tour Mexico Bus Company and/or the bus driver. So I've had 
to take a look at the principal/agency relationship. 
Based upon what I've reviewed, my ruling is that 
15 J the defendant's motion for summary judgment should be 
granted. First of all, with regard to the contract itself, 
that was the ticket, and I think that the terms of that are 
very clear. And that ticket, that contract, contains an 
express disclaimer by Morris as to the negligence of ground 
transportation companies and others. So I think the 
















The plaintiff's affidavit as to what he 
understood the terms to be or what he was led to believe, 


























contrary to the clear terms of the contract. And since the 
terms are clear, I don't believe that it's appropriate for 
the Court to receive extrinsic evidence as to what those 
terms "one party thought" meant. And so his affidavit does 
not raise issues of material fact as to that contract. 
And in terms of the brochures, I believe that the 
brochures, the language in the brochures simply does not 
raise any indication of a principal/agent relationship in 
the terms that the plaintiff seeks to have the Court find. 
I think the contract, going back to that, clearly says what 
the relationship is and the brochures do not raise any 
inference that are contrary to that. 
I think that states everything that I wanted to 
state. Is there anything that I've left you with a 
question about or that I've left out? 
MR. BULLOCK: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Thanks for your argument, 
counsel. I'm going to ask Mr. Bullock to prepare an order 
consistent with the ruling. 
MR. BULLOCK: Very well. 
THE COURT: Thanks. 
(Whereupon, the requested portion of transcript 
was completed.) 


























STATE OF UTAH 







_T_ J_ F I 
ss. 
_C_ _A_ T_ E 
I, JERI KEARBEY, a Certified Court Transcriber in 
and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify that the foregoing 
electronically-recorded proceedings were transcribed by me from tapes 
furnished by the Third Judicial District Court, Division I 
of the State of Utah; 
That pages 1 through 3 » both inclusive, represent 
a full, t rue , and correct transcript of the testimony given and the 
proceedings had on March 3, 1997 • and that said transcript 
contains all of the evidence, all of the objections of counsel and rulings 
of the Court, and all matters to which the same relate. 
DATED this 12th day of March 1997. 
<s£rv_^ 1 ^ * * w s A J&L 
JERI HEARBEY, CCT 
I hereby affirm that the foregoing transcript was 
prepared under my supervision and direction. 
^L. g^&btffe Peg y'<3*0#eri, CSR,RPR/Notary 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE were mailed, first class postage prepaid, this / 
day of April, 1997, to the following: 
Robert J. DeBry 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
